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Tax Morale

Erzo F. P. Luttmer and Monica Singhal

F

or over 40 years, the benchmark economic model of tax evasion has been
the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model, in which self-interested taxpayers
choose how much income to report to the tax authority by trading off the
benefits of evasion (lower tax payments) against the costs of evasion (the possibility
of being caught and punished). In this model, the key policy parameters affecting
tax evasion are the tax rate, the detection probability, and the penalty imposed
conditional on the evasion being detected.
However, there is an apparent disconnect between much of the academic
literature on tax compliance and the administration of tax policy. While tax administrators are obviously concerned about enforcement, they also tend to place a
great deal of emphasis on improving “tax morale,” by which they generally mean
increasing voluntary compliance with tax laws and creating a social norm of compliance. The OECD (2001), for example, noted that “[t]he promotion of voluntary
compliance should be a primary concern of revenue authorities” in its principles for
good tax administration, and it has highlighted the importance of tax morale more
generally (OECD 2013).
Tax authorities around the world pursue policies that reflect their belief that
nonpecuniary factors are important in tax compliance decisions. More than half of
US states have or have had “name and shame” programs in which the names of top
tax debtors are revealed publicly on state websites. In a more colorful example, the
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city of Patna in Bihar, India, deployed “singing eunuchs” to shame shopkeepers into
paying their taxes (BBC News 2006).1 An alternative to shaming tax evaders is to recognize compliant or high-paying taxpayers publicly, a strategy adopted by an increasing
number of developing countries. Some nations have instituted public campaigns to
change attitudes towards tax evasion. For example, recent television and print advertising campaigns in Italy have highlighted the need to reduce widespread tax evasion
in order to better cope with the European debt crisis (Povoledo 2011).
The term “tax morale” is often used in reference to these types of influences on tax
compliance. We will define tax morale broadly as an umbrella term capturing nonpecuniary motivations for tax compliance as well as factors that fall outside the standard,
expected utility framework. For example, individuals may have some intrinsic motivation to pay taxes or feel guilt or shame for failure to comply. They may comply due
to reciprocal motivations: the willingness to pay taxes in exchange for benefits that
the state provides to them or to others even though their pecuniary payoff would
be higher if they didn’t pay taxes. Individuals may be influenced by peer behavior
and the possibility of social recognition or sanctions from peers. Cultural or social
norms can affect the strength of these intrinsic motivations, reciprocal motivations, or
the sensitivity to peers. We will also include deviations from standard expected utility
maximization, such as loss aversion, in our definition of tax morale.
Michael Waweru (2004), then the head of Kenya’s revenue authority, captured
many of the tax morale channels we have in mind during a presentation to the
President of Kenya. Waweru said:
KRA [Kenya Revenue Authority] has organised a Taxpayers’ week from 18th
to 23rd October throughout the country. The period was carefully chosen to
coincide with Kenyatta Day celebrations in honour of our national heroes.
The running theme throughout the celebrations will be “Kulipa Ushuru ni
kulinda Uhuru” or “Pay your Taxes and set your country free” as a way of
paying glowing tribute to those who dedicated their lives to free our beloved
country from the humiliation of colonialism. Present taxpayers are taking a
leading role in freeing their country from donor dependency to economic
independence. The climax of these celebrations will be on 21st October 2004,
when we will be recognizing Distinguished Taxpayers.
The linkage of tax compliance with honoring national heroes is clearly meant
to prompt intrinsically motivated compliance, and the reference to compliance
reducing donor dependence highlights the notion that tax payments have a direct
benefit for society. The potential importance of peer effects and social norms is
illustrated through the decision to recognize “Distinguished Taxpayers” and the
adoption of a slogan that seems designed to change the overall social attitude toward
tax compliance. Notice that some of these policies may confer private pecuniary
1

The article uses the term “eunuch” for the community in South Asia referred to as “hijras,” who are not
necessarily eunuchs in the technical sense.
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rewards. For example, public recognition could improve firms’ reputations and
therefore revenues. Isolating the components of behavior that are attributable to
tax morale is therefore an empirical challenge.
We argue that tax morale is indeed an important component of tax compliance
decisions, though we view enforcement as the primary driver of compliance. We
then demonstrate that tax morale operates through a variety of underlying mechanisms, drawing on evidence from laboratory studies, natural experiments, and an
emerging literature employing randomized field experiments. We do not attempt
to provide a comprehensive review of the literature. Rather, we highlight a few
studies that illustrate specific channels through which tax morale can affect compliance behavior. Finally, we consider the implications for tax policy and attempt to
understand why recent interventions designed to improve morale, and thereby
compliance, have had mixed results to date.

How Important is Tax Morale?
The standard Allingham and Sandmo model (1972) is a straightforward application of the Becker (1968) model of crime to the tax-evasion context: risk-averse
individuals weigh the utility benefits and costs of evasion to optimize their compliance behavior. The model yields intuitive comparative statics—for example, that a
larger penalty or a greater probability of detection should lead to a reduction in
tax evasion. However, Allingham and Sandmo were also the first to recognize that
their model does not capture all motivations for tax compliance, writing: “This is a
very simple theory, and it may perhaps be criticized for giving too little attention to
nonpecuniary factors in the taxpayer’s decision on whether or not to evade taxes.”
Again, we use the term “tax morale” as a shorthand for any such nonpecuniary
factors as well as deviations from expected utility maximization.
A natural question is how important tax morale is for compliance: Is it a major
determinant of compliance or does it only have a trivial impact? A first sense of the
importance of tax morale comes from surveys that directly ask individuals about
attitudes towards tax evasion. For example, the World Values Survey asks respondents to rate the justifiability of “cheating on taxes if you have a chance.” Over
60 percent of respondents worldwide answer that cheating is never justifiable,
and over 80 percent give a response of 8 or higher on a 10-point scale where 10
denotes that cheating is never justifiable.2 Similarly, over 80 percent of respondents
to the 2004 wave of the European Social Survey “agreed” or “strongly agreed” with
the statement that “citizens should not cheat on their taxes.” These survey questions indicate a strong overall view that tax evasion is wrong, suggesting that the
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model does not capture the full range of factors
relevant for compliance.
2

Calculated from the 2005–2007 wave of the World Values Survey using data from 53 countries. Data
from Ghana and Serbia were omitted due to data quality issues.
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We would of course want to know whether these self-reported attitudes translate
into actual compliance behavior. Some studies have attempted to measure evasion
at the country level and relate this to survey measures of tax morale. However,
constructing valid proxies of tax evasion across countries is very challenging. In
addition, relating constructed proxies for tax evasion to tax morale (or other predictive variables) typically requires strong assumptions about how to measure untaxed
economic activity, assumptions which are unlikely to hold in practice (for a detailed
discussion, see Slemrod and Weber 2012).3
A second way to assess the importance of tax morale is indirectly, by attempting
to determine the degree of compliance that would be predicted given the characteristics of the enforcement environment. Additional residual compliance is then
attributed to tax morale. The Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model of tax evasion
does not take into account that audit rates could be conditional on discrepancies
between self-reported income and reports from third parties, such as employers
(Kleven, Knudsen, Kreiner, Pedersen, and Saez 2011). For example, individuals in
the United States are unlikely to evade on income that employers are required to
report to the IRS using a W-2 form because they know that such evasion will be
detected with near certainty. This situation can lead to low observed tax evasion,
as well as low audit and penalty rates in equilibrium. Hence, inferring tax morale as
residual compliance in the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model is credible only in
settings without third-party reporting.
Even on forms of income not subject to third-party reporting, compliance
often appears higher than would be predicted under observed audit rates, realistic
penalties, and plausible levels of risk aversion. Alm, McClelland, and Schulze (1992)
calibrate the Allingham and Sandmo model for reasonable parameter values for the
United States. They find that a mid-range estimate of the coefficient of relative risk
aversion (γ = 3) implies compliance of 13 percent, well below audit-based estimates
of compliance for most forms of business income (where third-party reporting is
limited) in the United States. For example, compliance on nonfarm proprietor
income in 2001 was 43 percent (Slemrod 2007). A recent audit study in Denmark
was able to distinguish third-party and self-reported income at the line-item level
(Kleven et al. 2011). The study found even higher compliance (in the range of
80–95 percent) for most sources of self-reported income. To put this in context, the
Alm, McClelland, and Schulze (1992) calibrations require the coefficient of relative

3

Perhaps the most commonly used proxies of tax evasion are measures of the shadow economy
constructed using a MIMIC (Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes) approach (for example, Schneider
2005, and subsequent measures derived from it). The resulting shadow economy measure is a weighted
sum of predictors such as per capita GDP, indicators of fiscal burden, quality of institutions, and sometimes even tax morale itself. While this measure can be informative about variation across countries
and over time, regressing the shadow economy measure on a predictor such as tax morale leads to a
mechanical relationship if tax morale was used to construct the shadow economy variable. Even if tax
morale isn’t used to construct the shadow economy measure, this regression ultimately uncovers a correlation between one predictor of the shadow economy (tax morale) and other predictors of the shadow
economy (that is, a weighted average of predictors such as GDP, fiscal burden and quality of institutions).
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risk aversion to be quite high (γ = 5) to achieve 44 percent compliance and extraordinarily high (γ = 10) to achieve 71 percent compliance.4
There are at least three caveats to these calibration exercises. First, audit studies
reveal detected evasion, which is likely to be a lower bound on true evasion. Second,
underreporting income or overreporting deductions is likely to invite scrutiny by the
tax authorities, even absent third-party reporting, so that audit rates are not random
but rather a function of misreporting. Finally, some residual compliance could be
driven by private pecuniary benefits from compliance, such as improved access to
credit or productivity gains from not needing to keep double books. Nevertheless,
these calibration exercises do suggest a nontrivial role for nonpecuniary factors in
encouraging tax compliance.
A third avenue for learning about the importance of tax morale is to examine
compliance behavior in environments where tax enforcement is limited or nonexistent and private pecuniary benefits of compliance are likely to be minimal. Dwenger,
Kleven, Rasul, and Rincke (2014), focus on such an environment in studying compliance with the local Protestant church tax in a metropolitan area in Bavaria. When
collecting the local church tax, the Protestant church makes clear that this tax
is legally obligated as specified by the German tax code. However, this tax is not
enforced and knowledge of the lack of enforcement appears widespread: a treatment
in which the collection letter explicitly stated that collection would not be enforced
had no statistically or economically significant effect on compliance. Despite the lack
of enforcement, about 20 percent of individuals pay at least as much tax as is owed,
indicating an important role for tax-morale-driven compliance in this setting.
Whether this finding generalizes is unclear for at least two reasons (which
work in opposite directions). First, the use of funds from the local church tax is
associated with a particular type of service, which individuals may value more than
the services funded by other types of taxes. Second, the fact that there was zero
enforcement, despite the fact that the tax is easily enforceable, is unusual. It could
signal to individuals that, while the church tax is technically a legal obligation, the
church/government does not actually consider it an important civic obligation.
This in turn could undermine tax morale.
A fourth way to shed light on the importance of tax morale on compliance is
to examine compliance behavior of taxpayers that measurably differ in tax morale
but all face the same enforcement environment. DeBacker, Heim, and Tran (2012)
relate corporate tax evasion of foreign-held corporations in the United States to
corruption levels in the owners’ countries of origin. Given that the enforcement
environment is common, the corruption levels in the countries of origin can affect
compliance only through a tax morale channel. An important strength of this study
is that it uses data from over 25,000 IRS corporate tax audits; it is rare that a study’s
To illustrate the degree of risk aversion an individual exhibits at γ = 5 and γ = 10, consider whether
an individual is willing to take a gamble that offers a 50 percent chance of doubling one’s income and a
50 percent chance of losing X percent of income. The individual with γ = 5 finds this gamble too risky to
accept if X ≥ 16 percent whereas an individual with γ = 10 declines this gamble whenever X ≥ 8 percent.

4
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information on tax evasion is available at the taxpayer level and is derived from
actual audit data. DeBacker, Heim, and Tran (2012) find that corporations with
owners from more corrupt countries evade more US tax. This effect is both statistically significant and economically sizable: an average-sized firm with an owner
from a country with the level of corruption of Nigeria has an evasion level that
is 8 percent of the tax obligation higher than a similar firm with an owner from
a country with the level of corruption of Sweden. The authors control for firm
characteristics and a number of other source-country characteristics (such as per
capita GDP), which reduces the scope for omitted variable bias to drive their results.
Given that corruption in the country of origin does not capture all aspects of the
owner’s tax morale (that is, owners from the same country may have different tax
morale), the estimated magnitude of tax morale is likely to be a lower bound of the
total effect of tax morale. Hence, this study suggests a sizable role for tax morale in
compliance decisions.
Our reading of these four sources of evidence taken together is that tax
morale plays a meaningful role in tax compliance behavior, at least in the
developed-country settings on which this evidence was largely based. It would be
useful to quantify the importance of tax morale relative to the importance of tax
enforcement, but implementing such a decomposition faces both conceptual and
practical challenges. Conceptually, the importance of tax morale depends on the
enforcement environment because tax morale and enforcement generally interact.
At one extreme, if enforcement is so draconian that compliance is perfect, there
is no role for tax morale. At the other extreme of no enforcement whatsoever, tax
morale may be eroded because the lack of enforcement efforts signals that compliance is unimportant.
One practical challenge is that—even in the absence of enforcement interactions—we would expect the relative importance of tax morale to vary across
countries and even across types of taxes within a country. Even in the rare cases in
which we are able to measure the role of tax morale (for example, in the German
church tax case), resulting estimates are unlikely to generalize. A further challenge when attempting to decompose cross-country variation in compliance is that
we measure tax morale on a scale that does not have a well-defined zero. In the
DeBacker, Heim, and Tran (2012) study of US corporate tax evasion mentioned
above, for example, we can compare compliance at different observed levels of tax
morale, but cannot assess what compliance would have been if tax morale were
zero. While we cannot quantify the relative importance of enforcement and tax
morale, our view is that enforcement is the primary driver of tax compliance but
that tax morale meaningfully enhances compliance.
It is important to note that what matters for policy is not so much what role tax
morale plays in current compliance, but whether it is feasible to improve tax morale
on the margin and whether a given increase in compliance can be achieved at a
lower cost by improving tax morale than by increasing enforcement. Before considering which policies could affect tax morale, it is therefore important to understand
the mechanisms through which tax morale may operate.
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Tax Morale Mechanisms
While tax morale is commonly used as a single concept, it can be more accurately thought of as a set of underlying motivations for tax compliance. Identifying
the channels through which tax morale operates is both important for understanding individual preferences and for designing appropriate policy responses.
We consider five broadly defined potential mechanisms through which tax morale
could operate, recognizing that these channels are not mutually exclusive and are
in fact likely to overlap and interact with each other.
The five classes of mechanisms are: 1) intrinsic motivation, which can be viewed
as an additional term in the utility function that increases in the amount of taxes
that the individual decides to pay (with, possibly, a discontinuous upward jump
for paying the required amount); 2) reciprocity, in which an additional utility term for
paying taxes depends in some way on the individual’s relationship to the state
(for example, on public goods provided by the state or perceptions about the fairness of the tax system); 3) peer effects and social influences, in which the additional
utility term for paying taxes depends on views or behaviors of other individuals;
4) long-run cultural factors that may affect the willingness to pay taxes; and 5) information imperfections and deviations from utility maximization (for example, individuals
may misperceive the probability of being detected in evading taxes or may exhibit
loss aversion).
Forms of Intrinsic Motivation
When considering how tax morale might influence taxpayer decisions, one
possibility is forms of intrinsic motivation that may induce people to comply with
laws and expectations. Other forms of intrinsic motivation are feelings of pride and
positive self-image that are often associated with honesty and the fulfillment of civic
duties, and altruism toward others, which could result in a willingness to contribute
to public goods through the tax system. Cheating on taxes may cause feelings of
guilt or shame (Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein 1998).
Direct evidence on the role of intrinsic motivations comes from Dwenger,
Kleven, Rasul, and Rincke (2014). As discussed above, this study documents some
degree of compliance with the local German Protestant church tax, even in an environment in which both actual and perceived enforcement is nonexistent. While
this overall compliance effect could be driven by several underlying components
of tax morale, we see sharp bunching at the exact level of owed tax. One interpretation of this bunching (if individuals are truly unconcerned about enforcement)
is that it reflects one specific form of intrinsic motivation: a desire to comply with
the law.
Indirect evidence on the role of intrinsic motivations comes from field experiments that have attempted to prime intrinsic motivations. These interventions take
the form of “moral suasion” letters to taxpayers that include text emphasizing various
elements of tax morale. The effects of these letters are generally compared to some
type of baseline letter to address the possibility that receiving a letter related to taxes
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might directly affect compliance by signaling a change in the enforcement regime.
If we observe treatment effects in response to such letters, this indicates that the
particular underlying channel of tax morale that was primed is operating. However,
it is important to stress that a lack of treatment effects does not necessarily imply
that the underlying channel does not influence compliance: it may exist, but be
inelastic to the particular intervention.
Indeed, many field interventions that have attempted to prime tax morale have
failed to find effects on compliance. An example of an intervention approximating
pure moral suasion is an experiment conducted by Fellner, Sausgruber, and Traxler
(2013), who examine evasion of TV and radio licensing fees in Austria. One of the
treatment arms added the following language to a baseline letter: “Those who do
not conscientiously register their broadcasting receivers not only violate the law, but
also harm all honest households. Hence, registering is also a matter of fairness.”
The study found that this moral suasion letter did not improve compliance relative
to the baseline letter. Other studies using this methodology include information
about how tax revenues are used or about the compliance of others. Since these
interventions seek to trigger motives like reciprocity or peer effects, we will discuss
them in the subsections below.
If tax payments are partially intrinsically motivated, then the extrinsic incentives of tax enforcement could potentially crowd out intrinsic motivation. This
possibility is predicted by theoretical models in which external incentives crowd out
prosocial behavior (for example, Bénabou and Tirole 2006). It is also consistent
with the authors’ own conversations with tax officials in developing countries, in
which the officials repeatedly expressed the view that heavy-handed tax enforcement could backfire by reducing “voluntary” compliance. But at least in the context
of local German church taxes—where we see clear evidence of intrinsically motivated payment—enforcement interventions have indicated that this type of crowd
out appears limited. Dwenger, Kleven, Rasul, and Rincke (2014) show that interventions with audit threats increase compliance of those who evaded in the prior
year but do not have a significant effect on payments by those initially paying at
or above the owed amount. Boyer, Dwenger, and Rincke (2014) conduct a related
randomized evaluation, in a setting similar to Dwenger et al. (2014), but focusing
on the local Catholic church tax rather than the local Protestant church tax. Letters
emphasizing that the church tax is a compulsory payment rather than a donation
appear to result in some crowd out for individuals who donated infrequently in
previous years, but have a small and insignificant effect on those who consistently
donated in the past.
While we do not wish to generalize too far from this specific context, the church
tax findings overall do suggest that enforcement does not erode intrinsic motivation. It thus can be a useful tool for compliance including in settings where some
individuals are intrinsically motivated. In theory, enforcement could even amplify
intrinsic motivation by signaling that tax compliance is an important legal or civic
duty, although field interventions to date have not been designed in a way that
would allow us to test for such effects.
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Reciprocity
We use the term reciprocity broadly for situations in which willingness to pay
taxes depends on the individual’s relationship with the state other than direct
tax–benefit linkages (where a tax payment directly causes benefits to the individual
to increase). Individuals may view taxes as part of a social contract: tax payments
are made in exchange for services provided by the state. This view of tax compliance suggests that compliance may be affected by perceptions of the legitimacy
of the state (Levi 1989) as well as by attitudes toward government or perceptions
about the fairness of the tax schedule (for example, Feld and Frey 2002; Hofmann,
Hoelzl, and Kirchler 2008). Compliance may also be affected by the types of
government services that are funded by tax revenues and how these are viewed by
the taxpayer.5
A number of studies have documented positive correlations between survey
measures of institutional quality, trust in government, and satisfaction with public
services and survey measures of tax morale (for a review, see OECD 2013), as well
as relationships between institutions and tax morale (for example, Torgler 2005).
However, specific causal channels can be difficult to isolate. Some studies have
manipulated these elements in a laboratory setting using student subjects, with
parameters approximating the US income tax system, and have found that participants are less likely to evade taxes when funds are given to an organization that they
support and when they feel active in the decision-making process (for example,
Alm, Jackson, and McKee 1993).
Changing the decision-making process or actual use of tax revenues is obviously
much more challenging outside the laboratory setting. Existing randomized field
studies have therefore attempted to prime reciprocal motivations by highlighting
the beneficial uses of tax revenues. One early study included a treatment arm that
described the types of social programs on which tax revenues in Minnesota are
spent, noting that “when taxpayers do not pay what they owe, the entire community suffers” (Blumenthal, Christian, and Slemrod 2001). Dwenger et al. (2014)
included a treatment arm emphasizing that local German church tax revenues fund
work in the parish, and Castro and Scartascini (2013) gave taxpayers in Argentina
information about specific public goods in their community that had recently been
provided by the local government. None of these studies found significant effects
of these treatments on tax compliance. Together with the Fellner, Sausgruber,
and Traxler (2013) findings, the literature to date thus suggests limited power
of a variety of types of moral suasion. Ariel (2012) even finds suggestive evidence of
moral suasion letters backfiring in a field experiment on value-added tax compliance by small corporations in Israel.

5

One channel that we include with reciprocity is the possibility that the individual’s willingness to comply
depends on the use of raised revenue. This channel could operate because the individual feels “pure”
altruism towards the beneficiaries of government spending. Despite the fact that pure altruism is strictly
speaking an intrinsic motivation, we discuss this channel in the current subsection because we cannot
empirically distinguish it from reciprocal motivations.
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However, there are some counterexamples. Bott, Cappelen, Sørensen, and
Tungodden (2014) examine compliance with foreign-income reporting requirements in a field experiment involving Norwegian taxpayers who had evaded taxes
on foreign income in a prior year. They find positive effects when the results of
their four moral suasion treatments are pooled. Three of these treatments highlighted the public goods on which tax revenues are spent while the fourth noted
that the majority of taxpayers comply fully, so compliance is a matter of fairness.
Hence, these treatments may have triggered other aspects of tax morale in addition to reciprocal motivations. Finally, Hallsworth, List, Metcalfe, and Vlaev (2014)
examine a different margin of compliance, showing that late payment of taxes in
the United Kingdom falls in response to reminder letters that emphasize the ways
in which tax revenue finances public goods.
One possible interpretation for the predominance of null findings is that
reciprocal motivations have little relevance for tax compliance decisions outside
the laboratory. However, it is also possible—and in our view, likely—that such interventions are often not powerful enough to affect compliance. Individuals’ views of
the competence of the government and the value of the public services it provides
are formed through a lifetime of personal experience: a few lines of text in a mailed
letter may just not be sufficient to cause taxpayers to update their beliefs or attitudes
in many contexts.
Manipulating other potential reciprocal motivations, such as attitudes about the
fairness of the tax system or trust in government, is difficult to do in the context of a
laboratory or field experiment. Some direct evidence on perceptions of fairness and
tax compliance comes from Besley, Jensen, and Persson (2014), who examine the
poll tax imposed in the United Kingdom starting in 1989–1990 under the Thatcher
government. The poll tax replaced a tax based on property values. A massive backlash against this tax forced its repeal only three years later and resulted in a return
to a property-value-based tax (the “council tax”). The authors argue that the backlash reflected a widespread perception that the poll tax system was unfair because it
was not related to ability to pay, and they document a sharp spike in evasion at the
time the poll tax was introduced.
While the move to a poll tax is an extreme example, the findings do suggest
that compliance decisions can be affected by government policy, conditional on a
given enforcement environment. If tax payment is motivated—at least in part—by
the benefits provided by taxation or perceptions of the legitimacy of the state, the
possibility of multiple equilibria arises. Weak tax morale could lead to low compliance, low revenue, and poor state capacity and provision of services, thereby further
reducing tax morale.
Peer Effects and Social Influences
We now turn to ways in which an individual’s compliance could be directly
affected by others. Individuals may wish to conform to the behavior of others, so
that peer compliance directly affects the individual’s own compliance. Individuals
may also wish to signal something about their type to their peers through their
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compliance behavior. The value of this signal may depend on peer compliance: for
example, paying taxes may only be a positive signal to others who are also compliant,
or inference about type could depend on the number of compliant taxpayers. Finally,
if individuals imperfectly perceive the enforcement environment, the behavior of
peers may influence individuals’ own beliefs about the consequences of tax evasion.
One implication of these models is that a shock to individual compliance can
be amplified through social influences. The Besley, Jensen, and Persson (2014)
study of Britain’s poll tax presents a model that includes both reciprocity arising
from perceptions of fairness of the tax schedule (defined as intrinsic motivation by the authors) as well as a social norm effect arising from a desire to signal
prosocial motivations to others. As noted above, the temporary shift to a poll tax
sharply increases evasion, arguably due to a reduction in reciprocity motivations.
However, higher levels of evasion persist well after the poll tax is replaced with the
property-value-based council tax, particularly in councils that had high evasion
during the poll tax period, consistent with a social norm effect.
These findings raise the question of whether governments have the capacity to
influence social norms for compliance in a positive way. As discussed in the introduction, tax authorities around the world have undertaken policies with this goal
in mind. A recent set of field experiments has begun to evaluate the causal impact
of such interventions on compliance. A first channel through which governments
could leverage social interactions is by providing information on peer behavior.
However, field experiments in high-compliance contexts notifying taxpayers that
over 90 percent of individuals comply have failed to find significant treatment effects
(Blumenthal, Christian, and Slemrod 2001; Fellner, Sausgruber, and Traxler 2013).
It is possible that these studies have not found treatment effects because individuals already had a clear sense of overall compliance. One study that examines
this possibility is Del Carpio (2014). In a field experiment on property tax collection
in Peru, she also collected perceptions of tax compliance and enforcement in the
treatment and control groups after the interventions had been administered.6 She
finds that an intervention combining information about peer compliance and a
payment reminder leads to a small and statistically insignificant increase in compliance relative to a baseline intervention consisting of only a payment reminder.
However, this combined intervention did not significantly influence perceptions of
peer compliance relative to the baseline intervention. At least in this experiment,
it is plausible that information on peer compliance failed to affect own compliance
because this information did not sufficiently alter perceptions of peer compliance.
One study that did find effects of providing information on peer behavior is
Hallsworth, List, Metcalfe, and Vlaev (2014), who examine the effects of a variety of
interventions on the timely payment of taxes in the United Kingdom. In addition
6

Examining responses relative to priors is also important because of the possibility of perverse effects. If
individuals realize that compliance is actually lower than they thought, they may reduce their own compliance behavior. This possibility is particularly important in developing economies, where tax compliance
is often low.
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to the “reciprocity” interventions discussed above, this study gave some participants
one of the following three messages about compliance norms: 1) “9 out of 10 people
pay their tax on time”; 2) “9 out of 10 people in the U.K. pay their tax on time”; or
3) “9 out of 10 people in the U.K. pay their tax on time. You are currently in the
very small minority of people who have not paid us yet.” They find significant effects
on early payment from all three messages, with the largest effects from the final
message. In a subsequent experiment, the authors test the “descriptive” norms from
the first experiment (what other individuals are doing) against “injunctive” norms
(what others believe should be done) and find that descriptive norms appear to be
more powerful overall. It is possible that these interventions did change individual
priors in this context; it may also be that this compliance margin (timely payment)
is more sensitive to such treatments than the evasion decision.
Another way in which governments could leverage social forces is to facilitate
social recognition for compliant taxpayers. Emerging evidence from field experiments suggests that recognition can in fact encourage compliance, at least under
some conditions. Dwenger et al. (2014) include a treatment arm in which those
paying at least the required amount of the German church tax have a probability
of having their names published in a local newspaper if they wish to do so. This
treatment reduces payments for those who had evaded the church tax in the past,
indicating that social recognition can backfire for those who lack intrinsic motivation to pay the church tax. In contrast, they find suggestive evidence that the
treatment further increases payments among those who were already motivated to
pay more than the required amount in the past.
These heterogeneous findings are perhaps not surprising: we would expect
the effects of social norms and recognition to depend on how individuals update
their priors about peer compliance and how they view the signaling value of compliance. These factors may vary both across contexts and across types of taxpayers.
Treatment effects may also cancel out in aggregate, if, for example, an intervention
causes some taxpayers to positively update their views about compliance but causes
others to update negatively. We view this body of evidence as indicative of a role
for peer effects and social influences in tax compliance but much remains to be
learned about the circumstances under which interventions targeting these motivations are effective in changing behavior.
Culture
Culture refers to broad social norms that persist over long periods of time
and across generations. Such persistence is one of the primary characteristics that
distinguishes “culture” from contemporaneous peer effects, though the two are
obviously related. The parameters of the additional utility term for paying taxes,
whether it is conditional on the state’s behavior or on the behaviors and views of
other individuals, can be considered part of one’s culture if these parameters reflect
(internalized) social norms that persist over long periods and across generations.
The obvious empirical challenge in discerning a causal effect of culture is to separate the effects of culture from other aspects of the environment. Studies examining
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the effect of culture on tax compliance have therefore attempted to examine the
behavior of individuals from different cultural backgrounds when placed in a similar
environment. One strand of literature has compared tax evasion in similar laboratory experiments across two or three countries (for example, Alm, Sanchez, and de
Juan 1995; Cummings, Martinez-Vazquez, McKee, and Torgler 2009; Gërxhani and
Schram 2006; Lefebvre, Pestieau, Riedl, and Villeval 2011). These studies generally
find differences across countries in tax evasion despite similar subject pools and
experimental protocols. However, given the limited number of countries in each
of these studies (three at most), these studies cannot credibly relate country-level
evasion to any measure of country-level tax morale. Hence, they measure culture as
a “residual”—that is, attribute whatever gap cannot be explained by the observable
factors in their study to the effect of culture or tax morale.
An alternative strategy to examine the effect of culture is to exploit variation
arising from individuals who reside in the same country (and are therefore arguably subject to the same current institutions and environment) but have varying
countries of origin. Using survey-based measures of tax morale, Halla (2012)
finds that American-born individuals in the United States have higher tax morale
when their country of ancestry has higher average tax morale, controlling for
individual demographics. Individuals in the United States with ancestors from a
country with a 10-percentage point higher tax morale have about a 4-percentage
point higher tax morale, where both tax-morale questions are measured as binary
variables. Kountouris and Remoundou (2013) find similarly sized effects among
first-generation immigrants in a large sample of European countries. A potential
concern with these findings is that culture could simply affect the interpretation
of or response to such survey questions. Thus, evidence on the role of culture is
more credible when tax morale can be related to other outcome measures, ideally
direct measures of tax evasion.7 The DeBacker, Heim, and Tran (2012) study of
US corporations with owners from different countries, discussed above, is able to
relate culture to actual compliance behavior in an analogous setting. Their finding
that corruption in firm owners’ countries of origin affects evasion even in a common
enforcement environment is a convincing demonstration that culture does influence real behavior.
Taken together, these results suggest that there are indeed cultural differences
across countries, both in attitudes toward evasion and compliance behavior. This

7
Because Halla (2012) has no measures of tax evasion of his General Social Survey respondents, he
cannot directly relate culture to outcomes for respondents. However, he ingeniously uses a “reverse”
strategy. He examines whether current evasion outcomes in the countries of ancestry can be explained
by tax morale as measured by respondents in the United States from the corresponding countries of
ancestry. As a proxy for evasion, he uses a widely used measure of underground production (also referred
to as “shadow economy”). However, as we noted earlier in footnote 3, it is generally not valid to relate
measures of the shadow economy that are constructed as combinations of predictors to measures of
tax morale. The particular measure of the shadow economy that Halla borrows from the literature is
constructed using tax morale data, so regressing it on tax morale can uncover a mechanical relationship.

162

Journal of Economic Perspectives

implies that we may see persistent differences in compliance across countries even
if they have similar enforcement environments.
Information Imperfections and Deviations from Expected Utility
Information imperfections and decision-making biases are not always considered in the context of tax morale, but they clearly represent deviations from a fully
rational model of tax compliance. Such factors could affect individuals making
compliance decisions in several ways: taxpayers might misperceive parameters of the
optimization problem (for example, the likelihood or consequences of an audit);
fail to comply due to limited attention or costs of complexity; or be subject to systematic biases in their decision process (for example, loss aversion or overweighting of
small probabilities).
Most tax authorities deliberately limit information on their auditing and
enforcement procedures. It would therefore not be surprising for individuals to have
incomplete information about true audit rates or penalties. Using matched IRS-survey
data from the United States, Scholz and Pinney (1995) find that individuals report
a subjective probability of getting caught (conditional on underreporting income)
that is on average an order of magnitude higher than the probability that the IRS will
actually audit an individual’s return. Further, they find that variation in actual audit
probabilities across individuals is not predictive of the variation in subjective probabilities of getting caught. However, these results come with a caveat: the subjective
probabilities of getting caught were based on a hypothetical case where the individual underreports income, which were then compared to IRS audit probabilities
that were based on all tax returns, not just those with underreported incomes. Naturally, the objective IRS audit probabilities would likely have been higher if they had
been based only on tax returns with underreported income.
In contrast, the Del Carpio (2014) study mentioned earlier finds that individuals in Peru perceive tax enforcement to be weaker than it actually is, which implies
that disclosure of true enforcement could enhance tax collection. Del Carpio
finds that a combination of a payment reminder and information about enforcement of a local property tax both increases perceived enforcement and results in
increased tax compliance. Interestingly, the effects appear to be largely driven by
the payment reminder, which suggests a failure of individual optimization due to
limited attention rather than through misperceptions of the probability of enforcement efforts.8 This is consistent with Hallsworth, List, Metcalfe, and Vlaev (2014),
which finds a direct effect of payment reminders on timely remittance of owed UK
income taxes. A role for limited attention is also found by Dwenger et al. (2014).
A “salience” treatment that shortens the standard German church tax mailing and
increases the focus on the church tax payment obligation, schedules, and deadline
8

Another possible interpretation is that the payment reminder itself increased enforcement perceptions
and the specific enforcement information did not have an incremental effect. Del Carpio (2014) finds
that the payment reminder on its own did not significantly increase perceived enforcement, although it
is possible that the lack of significance reflects lack of power in measured perceptions.
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significantly decreases the fraction of people who evade the church tax. Together,
these results suggest that tax payment may be subject to the same types of behavioral biases we observe in many other contexts: individuals may simply forget to
make payments or procrastinate in remitting owed taxes. In very low-enforcement
environments, such behavior not only delays tax payments but may in fact reduce
overall revenue collection if the tax authority lacks the capacity to follow up with
nonpayers. Individuals may also have limited information about the rules of the
tax code. Recent testimony to Congress from the US General Accountability Office
(2011), for example, argued that complexity contributes to the “tax gap” between
what tax is owed and what is paid. However, it is difficult to know the extent to which
complexity leads to honest errors in reporting versus facilitates deliberate evasion.
Finally, people may in some cases deviate from the behavior predicted by
expected utility theory in the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model. A first indication of such deviation comes from Alm, McClelland, and Schulze (1992), who find
in a laboratory setting that student subjects react remarkably strongly to a small audit
probability and that their behavior cannot be rationally explained at any level of riskaversion. Of course, the notion that individuals may overweight small probabilities
is predicted by prospect theory. More recently, two studies using large administrative datasets find evidence that individuals are much more likely to seek tax shelters
if they have a balance due than if they are to receive a tax refund. Rees-Jones (2014)
finds a shift in the mass of the balance-due distribution in the United States away
from positive amounts. This shift is particularly pronounced for taxpayers with
greater access to tax shelters. The author demonstrates that such behavior could
be driven by loss-averse individuals pursuing sheltering options more aggressively
when they have a balance due and rules out other plausible explanations for the
observed patterns. While tax sheltering need not imply illegality, it seems likely that
at least some of the increased use of tax shelters stems from tax evasion. Engström,
Nordblom, Ohlsson, and Persson (2013) pursue a related strategy using data from
Sweden. They demonstrate that the balance due prior to adjustments affects the rate
at which individuals claim deductions for “other expenses for earning employment
income” in a manner predicted by a model of loss aversion. This type of deduction
is a plausible proxy for tax evasion because it is notorious for high rates of claimed
deductions that are rejected if audited (around 90 percent of audited deductions in
this category are disallowed).

Policy Lessons
What policy lessons can we draw from the evidence on tax morale? The most
obvious lesson is that the extent of tax evasion can be affected by policies beyond
standard tax enforcement actions, such as detection probabilities and punishments.
Clearly, an Allingham and Sandmo–type model does not fully capture individual
motivations for tax compliance. This finding should not be surprising: channels
such as intrinsic motivation, social norms, peer effects, and limits to rationality are
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known to be important in a variety of other domains, including in the contexts of
charitable giving and private provision of public goods, which are closely related to
tax compliance.
The potential importance of tax morale in determining evasion suggests that
policymakers may have access to a broader range of instruments to affect compliance than implied by a standard enforcement model. Simple nudges to taxpayers,
such as presenting information in a more accessible form or providing payment
reminders, can reduce tax evasion (for example, Del Carpio 2014; Dwenger et al.
2014; Hallsworth et al. 2014). In addition, some evidence suggests policies that might
be helpful even though the effect of the policy itself has not yet been directly tested.
For example, the evidence from Engström et al. (2013) and Rees-Jones (2014) on
loss aversion indicates that tax compliance could potentially be improved through
over-withholding—because those who are likely to receive refunds are less likely to
be motivated by loss aversion to seek out tax shelters.
On the other hand, the direct evidence from field experiments attempting
to manipulate intrinsic motivation, reciprocity, and social norms to improve tax
compliance has been decidedly mixed. To the extent that such interventions have
been successful in changing behavior, they often appear to act primarily on “small
stakes” decisions like paying taxes on time or paying relatively small taxes and fees.
There are several ways to interpret these findings.
First, it could be that these channels do exist but are small in magnitude relative to the factors in the standard model. As discussed, assessing relative magnitudes
is very challenging. While many of the field experiments include an enforcement
treatment, it is generally extremely difficult to compare the “strength” of the
enforcement versus tax morale interventions or to know how they shift individuals’
beliefs relative to their priors. Note that it is also important to be cautious when
comparing the costs and benefits of threats of enforcement and social notifications.
Threat-of-audit letters (or more generally, letters that prime individuals to focus on
enforcement) are often not backed up by actual increases in enforcement. While
threatening enforcement is cheap, such threats must ultimately be backed up by
greater and potentially quite costly enforcement in equilibrium. In contrast, social
interventions may be relatively cheap in equilibrium.
Second, it could be that tax morale is important, but fairly inelastic. For
example, in a model with honest taxpayers and strategic taxpayers, intrinsic motivation may have a large effect on overall compliance (for the honest taxpayers), but
moral suasion interventions may not affect behavior for either group. Also, many
tax morale channels may be inelastic to the types of interventions that are feasible
for researchers to test experimentally. For example, designing field experiments
to affect culture would be very difficult. Interventions may also not be powerful
enough to overcome individual priors: a letter arguing that tax revenue is important for funding public goods may not be effective if individuals have a strong (and
perhaps accurate) belief that revenues are often expropriated or inefficiently spent.
However, these arguments do not imply that tax morale cannot be affected by actual
policies undertaken by governments: as the Besley, Jensen, and Persson (2014)
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paper on the poll tax experience in the United Kingdom indicates, even temporary
policies that affect tax morale can have lasting effects on compliance.
Finally, the evidence strongly indicates heterogeneous treatment effects in
response to interventions intended to affect tax morale. The effects of these interventions appear to be influenced by both the context (for example, are existing
levels of compliance high or low?) as well as characteristics of the individual
taxpayer (for example, does the taxpayer appear to be intrinsically or extrinsically motivated?). Obviously, heterogeneity makes designing appropriate policy
responses challenging: interventions targeting tax morale could be ineffective or
potentially even have perverse effects in some environments or for some population subgroups, and identifying the groups for which interventions are likely
to be effective (for example, the intrinsically motivated) may be quite difficult
in practice.
More broadly, what does it mean for tax policy if tax morale exists as a determinant of compliance and can be affected by government decisions? Conditional on
a given enforcement environment, there is at least the possibility for tax morale to
improve compliance. However, we do not see the potential importance of tax morale
as being limited solely to reducing the tax gap between what is owed and what is paid:
the possibility of tax-morale-driven compliance has broader implications for optimal
tax policy. For example, the structure of the tax schedule itself could influence
compliance through a tax morale channel, as indicated in the poll tax study. While
the switch to a poll tax is an extreme example, this study suggests that perceived
fairness of the tax schedule can affect compliance. This finding may hold true more
generally, even in cases in which isolating the causal effect of the tax schedule on
compliance is challenging. Tax morale could also affect how behavior responds to
taxation, depending on the specific channel of tax morale. If the channel is pure
altruism, for example, then individuals receive a direct utility benefit from an additional tax payment, which at least partly offsets the utility loss of the consumption
reduction due to the additional tax payment. Thus, pure altruism can reduce labor
supply responses to taxes. Tax-morale-driven compliance could also reduce individuals’ incentives to engage in costly behavior to avoid or evade taxes.

Directions for Future Research
Policymakers, practitioners, and researchers are developing a better understanding of the channels through which policies can leverage tax morale to improve
compliance, but there is clearly still much to learn. Here, we emphasize some of the
areas that could prove especially productive for research.
First, it would be useful to examine why similar interventions have produced
varying results in different contexts. In many cases, it is difficult to determine
whether the lack of effect of an intervention resulted because the intervention was
too weak to affect tax morale or because there truly was no meaningful effect of this
tax morale channel on compliance.
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Second, field studies of tax morale to date have been one-shot in nature. From
an academic perspective, observing dynamic effects could help to provide direct
evidence on specific channels of tax morale. From a policy perspective, the potential of ratchet effects alters the cost–benefit calculus of tax morale (and potentially
enforcement) interventions. For example, increases in compliance could be reinforced if individuals feel that they are getting better public services or if they respond
positively to peer compliance. Similarly, negative shocks to morale or to compliance
could lead to a downward spiral in tax morale and compliance.
Third, some of the most important channels of tax morale may be inelastic
to the types of interventions that are feasible in randomized trials, but elastic to
actual policies undertaken by governments. We applaud the recent move towards
field experiments conducted in collaboration with tax authorities around the world.
However, researchers should also consider other approaches to investigate components of tax morale, particularly those that cannot be easily manipulated in the field.
Some examples discussed in this paper include taking advantage of natural experiments, as in the Besley, Jensen, and Persson (2014) study of the United Kingdom
poll tax, and other creative identification strategies, like the paper by DeBacker,
Heim, and Tran (2012) that used variation in firm ownership to identify a culture
channel for tax morale.
Finally, existing empirical studies of tax morale have generally not attempted to
estimate the welfare effects of tax morale—which is unsurprising given that welfare
analysis can be challenging in settings where utility maximization does not fully
explain behavior or where the utility function depends on social effects. Moreover,
the welfare effects likely depend on the exact channels through which tax morale
operates; for example, do peer effects operate by giving people more warm-glow
utility from paying taxes or do they operate through a social sanction on being
caught evading? Despite the challenges of welfare analysis in the context of tax
morale, we see this as an important area for further research.
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